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Abstract
The mechanism used in Nash implementation is a form of direct democracy, tak-
ing everyone’s opinion into account. We augment this mechanism with a political
process that selects the opinions of a subset of the individuals. We study three such
processes – oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and random sampling – and compare the
social choice rules (SCRs) that can be implemented using each of these processes with
those that can be Nash implemented. In oligarchy, only the opinions of a fixed subset
of the individuals – the oligarchs – determine the implemented alternative. We obtain
a negative result for oligarchies: there exist Nash implementable SCRs that cannot be
implemented by any oligarchy. Oligarchic democracy is a perturbation of oligarchy,
in which the opinions of the oligarchs “almost always” determine the implemented
alternative but sometimes, everyone’s opinions are considered. In a sharp contrast
to the negative result for oligarchies, we show that in economic environments, every
Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by an oligarchic democracy in which
any three individuals act as oligarchs. In random sampling, opinions of a fixed number
of individuals are selected randomly, which then determine the implemented alterna-
tive. We show that in economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be
implemented by randomly sampling opinions of four individuals.
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1 Introduction
Consider a community of n individuals having a social choice rule (SCR) that specifies
the socially desirable alternatives conditional on the true preferences of these individuals.
This community would like to design a mechanism such that individuals’ incentives in the
mechanism are “aligned” with its SCR, i.e., given their true preferences, any Nash equilibrium
of the mechanism must lead to a socially desirable alternative and every socially desirable
alternative must be obtained under some Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. This is the
implementation problem under complete information.1 The standard mechanism in this
literature is defined by a set of messages for each individual and an outcome function mapping
each message profile to an alternative. This mechanism is a form of direct democracy since
every individual’s message is considered in the outcome function. However, direct democracy
is seldom used by communities to make decisions at national, state or even local levels.
Indeed, when n is large, it will be too costly and time consuming to collect opinions of every
individual in the community while making social decisions. By the time a data collector
gathers everyone’s opinions, the state of the economy might change, rendering the whole
exercise meaningless. In this paper, we augment the standard mechanism with a political
process that selects a subset of the individuals, which we call a senate. The messages of
the selected senators determine the implemented alternative while the messages of all other
individuals are ignored. We are interested in the relationship between a political process and
the SCRs that a community can implement if it were to adopt that political process.
In his seminal contribution, Maskin (1999) studied Nash implementation which, using
our terminology, is the implementation problem under direct democracy. He showed that
any Nash implementable SCR must be Maskin monotonoic. Maskin (1999) further proved
that if n ≥ 3, then Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient conditions for a
SCR to be Nash implementable.2 It follows that in economic environments (i.e., when at
most n−2 individuals have a common most-preferred alternative) with at least 3 individuals,
Maskin monotonicity is sufficient for Nash implementation of a SCR. We use these results
for direct democracy as benchmarks. In particular, for each political process studied in
this paper, we are interested in knowing whether every SCR that is Nash implementable
is also implementable using that political process. If the answer is yes, then replacing
direct democracy with such a political process based on messages of only a small number of
individuals can reduce the costs and time involved in collecting everyone’s opinions.3
1See Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002) and Serrano (2004) for surveys of implementation theory.
2For necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation see Moore and Repullo (1990), Sjo¨stro¨m
(1991), Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992).
3We do not explicitly model such costs of collecting messages. One possibility is to assume that there
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We restrict attention to three political processes: oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and
random sampling. In an oligarchy, the senate is exogenously fixed to a strict subset of the
individuals, whom we refer to as the oligarchs. Thus, only the messages of the oligarchs de-
termine the implemented alternative in an oligarchy. Oligarchic democracy is a perturbation
of the oligarchy in which the senate is “almost always” the exogenously fixed set of oligarchs
but there is a small chance of “regulating” this oligarchy through direct democracy. That is,
in an oligarchic democracy, the messages of only the oligarchs determine the implemented
alternative with probability “arbitrarily” close to 1 while with the rest of the probability, the
messages of all individuals determine the implemented alternative. Finally, in random sam-
pling, an exogenously fixed number of individuals, which is strictly less than n, are selected
at random to form the senate and only the messages of these selected individuals determine
the implemented alternative.4
A mechanism is now defined by a set of messages for each player, a political process that
selects the senate, and a set of outcome functions, one for each possible senate, mapping
messages of the senators to alternatives. This mechanism defines a strategic-form game in
which all individuals simultaneously announce their messages. The political process then
selects the senate and finally, the messages of the selected senators determine the imple-
mented alternative. Since the selection of the senate is stochastic, for any given message
profile, the outcome could be a lottery over the set of alternatives. We study the SCRs
that are implementable in Nash equilibrium of this game. That is, we require that every
Nash equilibrium outcome of the game is a socially desirable alternative and every socially
desirable alternative must be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. Thus,
Nash equilibrium outcomes are deterministic (i.e., the same alternative is implemented for
all possible senates) and hence, only off-the-equilibrium outcomes can be lotteries.
We must point out that it is possible to alter the mechanisms under each political process
so that an individual announces a message if and only if she is selected as the senator. There
is no change in our results under this participation requirement, which seems more reasonable
is a fixed cost of collecting each message equal to c. In Section 6, we briefly discuss the implication of our
results under this assumption. We must also point out that we do not consider the issue of communication
and processing burdens imposed on, respectively, the individuals and mechanism designer due to large size
of the message space (see, for e.g., Saijo (1988) and McKelvey (1989), who tackle this issue in the context
of Nash implementation).
4The selection of the senate in all these political processes is exogenous. Alternatively, one can consider
political processes in which the senate is selected endogenously, e.g., through elections. This alternative
model will be appropriate to situations when the community is aware of the implementation problem at the
time of the elections. On the other hand, if a new implementation problem arises after the elections and the
elected senate has a fixed term (e.g., due to an unanticipated financial crisis, the current senate must vote
on bailouts for financial institutions), then the model of oligarchy might be more appropriate. Nevertheless,
endogenous selection of senators offers an interesting area of research that we hope will be pursued in future.
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in socio-economic problems. A description of our results follows.
We show that any SCR that is implementable by oligarchy is also Nash implementable
by making the outcome function under the direct democracy unresponsive to the messages
of the commoners (individuals who are not in the oligarchy). However, the converse is not
true: we give an example of a SCR that is Nash implementable but it is not implementable
under any oligarchy. The reason is that the necessary condition for implementation under
oligarchy is stronger than Maskin monotonicity. This necessary condition says that if some
alternative a drops out of the SCR when the preferences change, then for some oligarch, there
must be a reversal of her preferences over alternatives around a (i.e., there exists alternative
b which goes from being weakly worse than a to strictly preferred to a). In contrast, Maskin
monotonicity requires the same preference reversal for some individual.
The perturbed process of oligarchic democracy, on the other hand, generates dramatically
opposite conclusions. We show that in economic environments, any Nash implementable SCR
is implementable by any oligarchic democracy that has at least three oligarchs. The identity
of the oligarchs does not matter for this result; any three players can be designated as the
oligarchs. In fact, the necessary and sufficient condition for implementation by oligarchic
democracy is even weaker than Maskin monotonicity.5 Thus, “regulation” of the oligarchy
by a “minimal” probability of direct democracy makes it possible to implement a larger
class of SCRs in economic environments. This success of oligarchic democracy, however,
does not carry over to non-economic environments. We give an example of a non-economic
environment and a SCR that is Nash implementable but not implementable by oligarchic
democracy with any subset of the individuals designated as oligarchs. The reason for this
failure of oligarchic democracy is the lack of “sufficient” diversity in the sets of most-preferred
alternatives of the oligarchs. As we show, any SCR satisfying Maskin monotonicity and no-
veto power can be implemented by an oligarchic democracy of at least three oligarchs who
never have a common most-preferred alternative. Furthermore, whenever such oligarchs exist
and everyone has a unique most-preferred alternative (e.g., strict preferences, single-peaked
preferences), then any Maskin monotonic SCR can be implemented by oligarchic democracy;
thus, we do not need the SCR to satisfy no-veto power in this case.
The last political process that we study is random sampling. We show that in economic
environments, any Nash implementable SCR is implementable by random sampling of at least
four individuals (actually, we prove this for a slightly larger class of environments). Thus,
in economic environments, instead of collecting the messages of everyone in the community,
5This is because the oligarchs can generate lotteries by changing their messages and we use the information
about their preferences over lotteries to construct the mechanism. Benoˆıt and Ok (2008, Remark 3) provide
an example to show that Maskin monotonicity is not necessary for Nash implementation if the planner can
implement lotteries and use the information about individuals’ preferences over lotteries.
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we simply have to collect the messages of four randomly selected individuals in order to
implement any Nash implementable SCR. It turns out, four is in fact the minimal sample
size that guarantees this result. We give an example of a SCR that is Nash implementable in
an economic environment but it is not implementable by random sampling when the sample
size is smaller than four.
Bochet (2007) and Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) introduce lottery mechanisms in the imple-
mentation problem under complete information. In a lottery mechanism, lotteries over al-
ternatives can be implemented at off-the-equilibrium messages. Thus, like in our notion of
implementation, equilibrium outcomes are deterministic. Under mild domain restrictions,
these authors show that Maskin monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for imple-
mentation of a SCR using lottery mechanisms.6 In general, an off-the-equilibrium message
profile can be mapped to any arbitrary lottery in a lottery mechanism. On the other hand,
in our oligarchic democracy and random sampling processes, the “structure” of the lottery is
constrained by the particular stochastic selection of the senate since once a senate has been
selected, a pure alternative is implemented. Nevertheless, in their proofs, Bochet (2007) and
Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) use simple lotteries with at most two alternatives in their respective
supports. This is similar to the lottery generated under oligarchic democracy (because the
senate is either the oligarchs or all individuals). In contrast to Bochet (2007) and Benoˆıt
and Ok (2008), however, commoners cannot induce a lottery in oligarchic democracy since
their messages are considered only in one senate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline the implementation problem and
provide preliminary definitions in Section 2. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we present the results
for, respectively, implementation by oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and random sampling.
We provide a brief conclusion in Section 6. Longer proofs are collected in Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
There is a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3. The set of social alternatives is A,
which can be infinite but not singleton. A lottery l is a probability distribution with a finite
support in A. For any lottery l, let l(a) denote the probability assigned by l to alternative
a ∈ A. We write a for both the alternative a ∈ A and the degenerate lottery that puts
probability 1 on the alternative a. Let ∆A denotes the set of lotteries.
Let Θ be set of states with at least two elements. A typical state is denoted by θ. We
assume that the players have complete information about the realized state.
6To prove the necessary part, they constrain the planner to use only the information about individuals’
preferences over alternatives.
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Each player has a state dependent preference ordering (i.e., complete and transitive
relation) θi over ∆A.7 Let θi and ∼θi denote, respectively, the strict and indifference
relations derived from θi .
For any i, θ and for all natural numbers k ≥ 1, define:
P1(i, θ) = {a ∈ A : a θi a′, ∀a′ ∈ A}
Pk+1(i, θ) = {a ∈ A \ Pk(i, θ) : a θi a′,∀a′ ∈ A \ Pk(i, θ)}
Thus, P1(i, θ) is the set of most-preferred alternatives for player i in state θ, P2(i, θ) is the
set of second preferred alternatives for player i in state θ and so on.
Assumption 2.1. Preferences over Lotteries are Monotone: We assume that for all i ∈ N ,
θ ∈ Θ, and l, l′ ∈ ∆A, we have
K∑
k=1
∑
a∈Pk(i,θ)
l(a) ≥
K∑
k=1
∑
a∈Pk(i,θ)
l′(a),∀K ≥ 1 =⇒ l θi l′
and whenever at least one inequality is strict, then l θi l′.
Hence, shifting probability from alternatives lower in the preference ordering to alterna-
tives higher in the preference ordering generates a preferred lottery.
2.1 Environment
The environment is E =
〈
N,A,
(
(θi )i∈N
)
θ∈Θ
〉
. We consider different classes of environ-
ments, the most important being economic environment as defined by Bergemann and Morris
(2008).
Definition 2.2. An environment E is economic in state θ if for any a ∈ A, there exist i 6= j
and alternatives ai and aj such that
ai θi a and aj θj a.
An environment E is economic if it is economic in every state θ ∈ Θ.
Observe that E is an economic environment if and only if in any state θ, an alternative
is most-preferred by at most n − 2 players, i.e., ⋂i∈S P1(i, θ) = ∅ for all S ⊆ N such that
7We take these state-dependent preference orderings over ∆A as primitives of the model instead of the
state-dependent preference orderings over the set of probability measures on A (set of probability measures
on A is in general a superset of ∆A). This is because every outcome in the mechanisms that we study lies
in ∆A.
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|S| ≥ n− 1. This definition of economic environment is weaker than the usual definition in
the literature. For instance, Serrano (2004) calls an environment as economic when, as part
of the description of alternatives, there exists a private good like money over which players
have strictly monotonic preferences (in such an environment, no two players have a common
most-preferred alternative).
Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) define the class of environments satisfying top-coincidence condi-
tion.
Definition 2.3. The environment E satisfies top-coincidence condition if for any θ ∈ Θ and
S ⊂ N such that |S| = n− 1, ⋂i∈S P1(i, θ) is at most a singleton.
Thus, an environment that satisfies top-coincidence condition is such that in any state,
any subset of n − 1 players have at most one common most-preferred alternative. Clearly,
any economic environment satisfies the top-coincidence condition. Therefore, the class of
environments identified by top-coincidence condition is weaker than the class of economic
environments.
We define two other classes of environments.
Definition 2.4. The environment E satisfies unique-top condition if for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ,
the set of most-preferred alternatives P1(i, θ) is singleton.
In an environment satisfying unique-top condition, every player has exactly one most-
preferred alternative in each state. An example of such an environment is when all players
have strict preferences, i.e., for all i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, and a, a′ ∈ A, we have a ∼θi a′ ⇐⇒ a = a′.
Another example of an environment satisfying the unique-top condition is when every player’s
preference is single-peaked over A. It is easy to see that any environment that satisfies
unique-top condition must also satisfy top-coincidence condition. However, there is no logical
relation between the class of economic environments and the class of environments satisfying
the unique-top condition, i.e., there exist both economic environments that do not satisfy the
unique-top condition and noneconomic environments that satisfy the unique top condition.
Definition 2.5. Let S ⊆ N . The environment E satisfies diversity of top alternatives for
S (DTA-S) if in any state, there does not exist an alternative that is unanimously most-
preferred by every player in S, i.e.,
⋂
i∈S P1(i, θ) = ∅ for any θ ∈ Θ.
For a given S ⊆ N , there are both economic and noneconomic environments that sat-
isfy DTA-S. Moreover, if |S| ≥ n − 1, then every economic environment satisfies DTA-S.
However, if |S| ≤ n− 2, then there exist economic environments that do not satisfy DTA-S.
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2.2 Social Choice Rules
Social goals are embodied in a social choice rule (SCR), which is a nonempty-valued corre-
spondence F : Θ A.
The following two properties of SCRs are prominent in the literature on Nash implemen-
tation.
Definition 2.6. SCR F is Maskin monotonic if whenever an alternative a ∈ F (θ) and
a /∈ F (θ′) for some θ and θ′, there exist player i ∈ N and a′ ∈ A such that
a θi a′ and a′ θ
′
i a.
Definition 2.7. SCR F satisfies no-veto power if for any θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ N such that
|S| ≥ n− 1, we have ⋂
i∈S
P1(i, θ) ⊆ F (θ).
We will later introduce other notions of monotonicity and no-veto power among a subset
of the players.
2.3 Mechanism
A social planner, who does not know the realized state, designs a mechanism in order to
“implement” a SCR. The standard definition of a mechanism involves a set of messages for
each player and an outcome function that maps a profile of messages of all players into the
set of alternatives. We augment this definition with a political process that selects a senate,
i.e., a subset of the players. Ultimately, the outcome is a function of only the messages of
the senators. Formally, let N = 2N \ ∅ be the set of all possible senates. Then a mechanism
is a triplet Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , P, (gS)S∈N ), where
• Mi is the set of opinions or messages that player i can announce.
• P is a political process for selecting a senate. If S ⊆ N is the selected senate, then the
messages of the players in S, (mi)i∈S, are transmitted to the planner and the messages
of all players j /∈ S are ignored.
• gS : ∏i∈SMi → A is the outcome function conditional on the selection of the senate
S ⊆ N . Note that the outcome function gS is deterministic.
We let m denote a typical element of
∏
i∈N Mi. For any m ∈
∏
i∈N Mi and S ⊆ N , let
mS be the projection of m into
∏
i∈SMi (note that if S = N , then m
N = m). That is, given
8
any profile m of messages of all players, mS is the profile of messages of only the players in
S.
2.4 Political Processes
In this paper, we consider the following political processes: direct democracy, oligarchy,
oligarchic democracy and random sampling. We define these processes next.
2.4.1 Direct Democracy
We define direct democracy, denoted by D, as the political process that selects N as the
senate with probability 1. Hence, in direct democracy, every player’s message is transmitted
to the planner. A direct-democratic mechanism, ΓD = ((Mi)i∈N , D, (gS)S∈N ), is a mechanism
that uses direct democracy to select the senate.8
For any realization θ, the direct-democratic mechanism ΓD defines the strategic-form
game 〈ΓD, θ〉. In this game, each player i announces a message mi ∈Mi. Since the political
process is direct democracy, the messages of all the players are transmitted to the planner.
The planner then implements the alternative gN(m). The players’ preferences are given by
the profile (θi )i∈N . Let NE(ΓD, θ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of 〈ΓD, θ〉.9
The literature has exclusively focused on direct-democratic mechanisms. The correspond-
ing notion of implementation is called Nash implementation.
Definition 2.8. SCR F is Nash implementable if there exists a direct-democratic mechanism
ΓD = ((Mi)i∈N , D, (gS)S∈N ) such that{
gN(m) : m ∈ NE(ΓD, θ)
}
= F (θ), for all θ ∈ Θ.
Maskin (1999) proves that Maskin monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation.
Theorem 2.9 (Maskin (1999)). If SCR F is Nash implementable, then F is Maskin
monotonic.
In general environments with at least three players, Maskin (1999) shows that Maskin
monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient for Nash implementation.
8Since messages of all players are transmitted to the planner, we only need to specify the outcome function
gN as none of the other outcome functions are ever used in a direct democracy. However, we continue to list
these functions in the definition of direct-democratic mechanisms just to make it consistent with the general
definition of mechanisms given earlier. Similar remarks apply to other political processes.
9Like most of the literature on implementation, we restrict ourselves to pure strategies throughout this
paper.
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Theorem 2.10 (Maskin (1999)). If n ≥ 3, then any Maskin monotonic SCR that satisfies
no-veto power is Nash implementable.
Since no-veto power is vacuously satisfied in economic environments, we have the follow-
ing corollary:
Corollary 2.11. SCR F is Nash implementable in an economic environment with n ≥ 3 if
and only if it is Maskin monotonic.
2.4.2 Oligarchy
Let S be any proper subset of N . We define S oligarchy, denoted by O(S), as the political
process that selects S as the senate with probability 1. Hence, in S oligarchy, the messages
of all players in S – the oligarchs – are transmitted to the planner whereas the messages of
all players in N \ S – the commoners – are ignored. An S-oligarchic mechanism, ΓO(S) =
((Mi)i∈N , O(S), (gS
′
)S′∈N ), is a mechanism that uses S oligarchy to select the senate.
For any realization θ, the S-oligarchic mechanism ΓO(S) defines the strategic-form game
〈ΓO(S), θ〉. In this game, each player i announces a message mi ∈Mi. Since the political pro-
cess is S oligarchy, the messages of all the oligarchs S and only these players are transmitted
to the planner. The planner then implements the alternative gS(mS). The players’ prefer-
ences are given by the profile (θi )i∈N . Let NE(ΓO(S), θ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of
〈ΓO(S), θ〉.
Definition 2.12. Let S ⊂ N . SCR F is implementable by S oligarchy if there exists a
S-oligarchic mechanism ΓO(S) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S), (gS
′
)S′∈N ) such that{
gS(mS) : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S), θ)
}
= F (θ), for all θ ∈ Θ.
Remark 2.13. In a S-oligarchic mechanism, the commoners also announce their messages
even though they know for sure that their messages will be ignored. A more reasonable
assumption is that a player announces her message if and only if she knows that she is a
senator. This alternative assumption can be easily incorporated into the model since for
every S-oligarchic mechanism that implements F , there exists a corresponding game form
that also implements F but asks only the oligarchs to announce their messages. To see this,
fix an S-oligarchic mechanism ΓO(S) that implements F . Consider the following game form:
all the oligarchs S simultaneously announce their messages (mi)i∈S ∈
∏
i∈SMi, which are
transmitted to the planner who then implements gS((mi)i∈S). Clearly, this game form also
implements F in Nash equilibrium.
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2.4.3 Oligarchic Democracy
By S-oligarchic democracy, we mean the political process in which the senate is either a
fixed S ⊂ N or N but the probability it is N is arbitrarily close to 0. To capture the idea of
“arbitrarily close to 0”, we define a sequence of political processes in which the probability
of selecting N as the senate is converging to 0.
Formally, for any S ⊂ N and  ∈ (0, 1), let (S, )-oligarchic democracy, denoted by
O(S, ), be the political process that selects S as the senate with probability 1 −  and N
as the senate with probability . Hence, in (S, )-oligarchic democracy, either the messages
of only the players in S – the oligarchs – are transmitted to the planner with probability
1 −  or the messages of all players in N are transmitted to the planner with probability
. An (S, )-oligarchic-democratic mechanism, ΓO(S,) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, ), (gS
′
)S′∈N ), is a
mechanism that uses (S, )-oligarchic democracy to select the senate.
For any realization θ, the (S, )-oligarchic-democratic mechanism ΓO(S,) defines a strategic-
form game 〈ΓO(S,), θ〉. In this game, each player i announces a message mi ∈Mi. Since the
political process is (S, )-oligarchic democracy, either the messages of all the oligarchs S are
transmitted to the planner with probability 1−  or the messages of all the players in N are
transmitted to the planner with probability . If the planner only receives the messages of
the oligarchs S, then she implements the alternative gS(mS); on the other hand, if the plan-
ner receives the messages of all the players in N , then she implements the alternative gN(m).
This induces the lottery l[S, ,m] in ∆A such that l[S, ,m] assigns probability 1 −  to al-
ternative gS(mS) and probability  to alternative gN(m). The players’ preferences are given
by the profile (θi )i∈N . Let NE(ΓO(S,), θ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of 〈ΓO(S,), θ〉.
Definition 2.14. Let S ⊂ N . SCR F is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy if there
exists a sequence of (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanisms(
ΓO(S,k) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, k), (g
S′)S′∈N )
)∞
k=1
such that for all k,
(i) k ∈ (0, 1) with limk→∞ k → 0 and
(ii)
{
l[S, k,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ)
}
= F (θ), for all θ ∈ Θ.
Condition (i) in the above definition formalizes the idea that the probability of selecting
N as the senate is “arbitrarily close to 0”. Condition (ii) has two requirements. First, if m ∈
NE(ΓO(S,k), θ), then we must have l[S, k,m] ∈ F (θ), i.e., l[S, k,m] is deterministic with
gS(mS) = gN(m) ∈ F (θ). Second, for any a ∈ F (θ), there must exist m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ)
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such that l[S, k,m] = a. Hence, although lotteries are generated in the selection of the
senators, implementation by S-oligarchic democracy requires exact implementation of the
SCR by every (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanism.
Remark 2.15. The alternative assumption that a player announces her message if and
only if she is a senator can also be incorporated into oligarchic democracy. Fix a (S, )-
oligarchic-democratic mechanism that implements F . Consider the following extensive-form
game: first, the oligarchs S announce their messages (mi)i∈S ∈
∏
i∈SMi. Then, with prob-
ability 1 − , the game ends and planner implements gS((mi)i∈S); but with probability ,
the planner asks the commoners to announce their messages (mj)j∈N\S ∈
∏
j∈N\SMj and
then implements gN
(
(mi)i∈S, (mj)j∈N\S
)
. A crucial assumption is that the commoners do
not observe the oligarchs’ messages when they are asked to announce their messages. In this
extensive-form game, every player moves at exactly one information set and thus, it has the
same strategic form as ΓO(S,). Hence, the extensive-form game also implements F in Nash
equilibrium.10
2.4.4 Random Sampling
The final political process that we consider is random sampling. In this process, denoted
by R(n¯), the planner randomly chooses a sample of the messages of the players, where the
sample size is fixed at some positive integer n¯ < n. Let Nn¯ denote the set of all senates
S ∈ N such that |S| = n¯. Thus, in random sampling, the senate is equally likely to be any
S ∈ Nn¯. The R(n¯)-sampling mechanism, ΓR(n¯) = ((Mi)i∈N , R(n¯), (gS)S∈N ), is a mechanism
that uses R(n¯) sampling procedure to select the senate.
For any realization θ, the R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) defines a strategic-form game
〈ΓR(n¯), θ〉. In this game, each player i announces a message mi ∈ Mi. Since the political
process is R(n¯), a subset S ∈ Nn¯ is chosen with probability 1/|Nn¯| and the messages of
all the players in S are transmitted to the planner. The planner then implements the
alternative gS(mS). Thus, the probability that the alternative gS(mS) is implemented is
equal to 1/|Nn¯|. Let l[R(n¯),m] be the lottery in ∆A, which for all S ∈ Nn¯, assigns probability
1/|Nn¯| to alternative gS(mS). The players’ preferences are given by the profile (θi )i∈N . Let
NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of 〈ΓR(n¯), θ〉.
Definition 2.16. SCR F is implementable by n¯-random sampling if there exists a R(n¯)-
10In fact, we can argue that in each state, the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the extensive-form game
coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of ΓO(S,). This is because all players have the same incentives at
their respective information sets in both game forms. This is clearly true for the oligarchs. Although the
commoners find out that they are in the senate if they are asked to play the game yet, since preferences over
lotteries are monotone, their incentives in the extensive-form game are the same as in ΓO(S,).
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sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) = ((Mi)i∈N , R(n¯), (gS)S∈N ) such that{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ)
}
= F (θ), for all θ ∈ Θ.
Thus, just like in the model of oligarchic democracy, implementation by n¯-random sam-
pling requires exact implementation of the SCR even though a lottery is used in the sampling
of the messages.
Remark 2.17. The alternative assumption that a player announces her message if and only
if she is a senator can also be incorporated into random sampling. Fix a R(n¯)-sampling
mechanism that implements F . Consider the following extensive-form game: first, a senate
of size n¯ is randomly chosen but the selected senators S are not informed of each other’s
identities. Then the senators S announce their messages (mi)i∈S ∈
∏
i∈SMi and g
S((mi)i∈S)
is implemented. In this extensive-form game, every player moves at exactly one information
set and thus, it has the same strategic form as ΓR(n¯). Hence, the extensive-form game also
implements F in Nash equilibrium.11
3 Implementation by Oligarchy
Consider any set of oligarchs S ⊂ N . It is easy to see that a S oligarchy in environment
E =
〈
N,A,
(
(θi )i∈N
)
θ∈Θ
〉
is equivalent to a direct democracy in the restricted environment
E(S) =
〈
S,A,
(
(θi )i∈S
)
θ∈Θ
〉
. Hence, the necessary and sufficient conditions for implemen-
tation by S oligarchy in environment E will be equivalent to the corresponding conditions
for Nash implementation in environment E(S).
Restricting attention to a set of oligarchs S, we can define notions of monotonicity and
no-veto power with respect to S as follows:
Definition 3.1. Let S ⊂ N . SCR F is S-monotonic if whenever a ∈ F (θ) and a /∈ F (θ′)
for some a, θ and θ′, there exist player i ∈ S and a′ ∈ A such that
a θi a′ and a′ θ
′
i a.
11Under the stronger assumption that players’ preferences over lotteries satisfy the independence axiom,
we can argue that in each state, the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the extensive-form game coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria of ΓR(n¯). When a player is asked to play, she finds out that she is in the
senate but she does not know who else is in the senate. However, due to the independence axiom, the player’s
incentives in the extensive-form game are the same as in ΓR(n¯).
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Definition 3.2. Let S ⊂ N . SCR F satisfies S-no-veto power if for any θ ∈ Θ and S ′ ⊆ S
such that |S ′| ≥ |S| − 1, we have ⋂
i∈S′
P1(i, θ) ⊆ F (θ).
We easily obtain the following corollaries from, respectively, Theorems 2.9 and 2.10:
Corollary 3.3. If SCR F is implementable by S oligarchy, then F is S-monotonic.
Corollary 3.4. If 3 ≤ |S| < n, then any SCR that satisfies S-monotonicity and S-no-veto
power is implementable by S oligarchy.
S-no-veto power is vacuously true if E(S) is an economic environment. Hence, we have
the following result:
Corollary 3.5. Suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E(S) is an economic environment. SCR F is
implementable by S oligarchy if and only if it is S-monotonic.
3.1 Comparison
Clearly, S-monotonicity is stronger than Maskin monotonicity. Furthermore, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3.6. If an SCR F is implementable by S oligarchy for some S ⊂ N , then F
is Nash implementable.
Proof. Let ΓO(S) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S), (gS
′
)S′∈N ) be the S-oligarchic mechanism that imple-
ments F . Define the direct democracy ΓD = ((Mi)i∈N , D, (gˆS
′
)S′∈N ) such that gˆN(m) =
gS(mS),∀m ∈ M , and gˆS′ = gS′ ,∀S ′ 6= N . It is easy to show that for all θ, we have
m ∈ NE(ΓO(S), θ) ⇐⇒ m ∈ NE(ΓD, θ), and hence, the result follows.
Thus, in any environment, any SCR that is implementable by an oligarchy is also im-
plementable by direct democracy (i.e., Nash implementable). However, the converse is not
true. That is, there are SCRs that are Nash implementable but not implementable by S
oligarchy for any S ⊂ N . Consider the following example:
Example 3.7. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {a, b, c, d} and Θ = {θ, θ′}. The preferences of the
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four players over alternatives in the two states are as follows:
θ θ′
a θ1 b θ1 c θ1 d b θ′1 a θ′1 c θ′1 d
b θ2 c θ2 d θ2 a c θ′2 b θ′2 d θ′2 a
c ∼θ3 d θ3 a θ3 b d θ′3 c θ′3 a θ′3 b
a θ4 d θ4 b θ4 c d ∼θ′4 a θ′4 b θ′4 c
Consider the SCR F such that F (θ) = {a, b, c} and F (θ′) = {d}. Player 1 is the only player
i for whom there exists an alternative aˆ such that a θi aˆ and aˆ θ′i a. Player 2 is the only
player i for whom there exists an alternative aˆ such that b θi aˆ and aˆ θ′i b. Player 3 is the
only player i for whom there exists an alternative aˆ such that c θi aˆ and aˆ θ′i c. Finally,
player 4 is the only player i for whom there exists an alternative aˆ such that d θ′i aˆ and
aˆ θi d. Therefore, F is Maskin monotonic but not S-monotonic for any S ⊂ N . Since the
environment is economic, it follows that F is Nash implementable but it is not implementable
by any S oligarchy. 
4 Implementation by Oligarchic Democracy
4.1 Necessary Condition
Definition 4.1. Let S ⊂ N . SCR F is weak S-monotonic if there exists a sequence (k)∞k=1
with k ∈ (0, 1),∀k, and limk→∞ k = 0 such that whenever a ∈ F (θ) and a /∈ F (θ′) for some
a, θ and θ′ then for all k either:
(i) there exist player ik ∈ N \ S and alternative a′k such that a θik a′k and a′k θ
′
ik
a or
(ii) there exist player ik ∈ S, lottery lk, and alternatives aˆk and a˜k such that
lk(aˆk) = k, lk(a˜k) = 1− k, a θik lk and lk θ
′
ik
a.
Thus, weak S-monotonicity requires that there exists a sequence of positive probabilities
k converging to 0 such that whenever an alternative a is in the SCR for some state θ but
drops out of the SCR in state θ′, then in going from θ to θ′, there must exist either (i)
some commoner, for whom there is reversal of her preferences over alternatives around a
(i.e., there is another alternative that she weakly prefers to a in θ but this is not true in θ′)
or (ii) some oligarch, for whom there is reversal of her preferences over lotteries around a
(i.e., there is a lottery that she weakly prefers to a in θ but this is not true in θ′), where we
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consider only those lotteries that have at most two alternatives in their supports and assign
probability of k to one of those alternatives.
As we show in the next result, weak S-monotonicity is a necessary condition for imple-
mentation by S-oligarchic democracy.
Theorem 4.2. If SCR F is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy, then F is weak S-
monotonic.
Proof. Let
(
ΓO(S,k) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, k), (g
S′)S′∈N )
)∞
k=1
be the sequence of (S, k)-oligarchic-
democratic mechanisms with k ∈ (0, 1),∀k, and limk→∞ k → 0, which implement F by
S-oligarchic democracy. We show that F is weak S-monotonic.
Consider the sequence (k)
∞
k=1. Suppose there exist a, θ and θ
′ such that a ∈ F (θ) but
a /∈ F (θ′). Then for all k, there must exist mk ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ) with l[S, k,mk] = a, i.e.,
gN(mk) = gS(mkS) = a. Since a /∈ F (θ′), it must be that mk /∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ′). Hence,
there must exist ik ∈ N and mik ∈Mik such that
a θik l[S, k, (mik ,mk−ik)] and l[S, k, (mik ,mk−ik)] θ
′
ik
a.
If ik ∈ N \ S, then gS
(
(mik ,m
k
−ik)
S
)
= a. Hence, in this case, l[S, k, (mik ,m
k
−ik)] is a
lottery which assigns probability k to alternative g
N(mik ,m
k
−ik) = a
′
k and probability 1− k
to alternative a. Since the preferences over lotteries are monotone, we have a θik a′k and
a′k θ′ik a. Thus, the first condition in the definition of weak S-monotonicity is satisfied.
If ik ∈ S, then l[S, k, (mik ,mk−ik)] is a lottery which assigns probability k to alter-
native gN(mik ,m
k
−ik) = aˆk and probability 1 − k to gS
(
(mik ,m
k
−ik)
S
)
= a˜k with a θik
l[S, k, (mik ,m
k
−ik)] and l[S, k, (mik ,m
k
−ik)] θ
′
ik
a. Hence, in this case, the second condition
in the definition of weak S-monotonicity is satisfied.
The above proof also makes it clear why we require a reversal of preferences over al-
ternatives for a commoner while a reversal of preferences over lotteries with at most two
alternatives in their supports for oligarchs. In S-oligarchic democracy, the messages of the
commoners are only considered in case N is selected as the senate. As a result, by changing
her message in an oligarchic-democratic mechanism, a commoner can at most change the
alternative that is implemented when the senate is N . Hence, whenever a commoner has an
improving unilateral deviation, it must be that she is able to generate a strictly preferred
alternative when the senate is N . On the other hand, the messages of the oligarchs are
considered irrespective of whether S or N is the senate. Hence, by changing her message in
an oligarchic-democratic mechanism, an oligarch can, in principle, change any of the alter-
natives that are implemented when the senate is S and when the senate is N . That is why,
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whenever an oligarch has an improving unilateral deviation, it must be that she is able to
generate a strictly preferred lottery with at most two alternatives in its support.
Note that the reversal of preferences over lotteries around an alternative is a weaker
requirement than the reversal of preferences over alternatives around an alternative. Thus,
we have the following lemma (proof is omitted):
Lemma 4.3. If F is Maskin monotonic, then F is weak S-monotonic for all S ⊂ N .
4.2 Economic Environments
4.2.1 Sufficient Condition
It turns out, if there are at least three oligarchs in S, then weak S-monotonicity of an SCR
is also a sufficient condition for its implementation by S-oligarchic democracy in economic
environments.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E is an economic environment. If SCR F is weak
S-monotonic, then F is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy.
Sketch of the proof : Consider the sequence (k)
∞
k=1 with respect to which F satisfies the defi-
nition of weak S-monotonicity. For all k, define the (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanism
ΓO(S,k) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, k), (g
S′)S′∈N ) such that for all i ∈ N ,
Mi = Θ× A× A× A× Z+,
where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. Let a typical message mi be of the form
(θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , zi). The outcome function g
N is as follows:
(i) If for every player i ∈ N , mi = (θ, a1i , a, a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gN(m) = a.
(ii) If for n − 1 players i 6= j in N , mi = (θ, a1i , a, a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), but mj =
(θj, a
1
j , a
2
j , a
3
j , zj) 6= (θ, a1j , a, a, 0), then
j ∈ N \ S =⇒ gN(m) =
{
a if a2j θj a
a2j if a θj a2j ,
j ∈ S =⇒ gN(m) =
{
a if lk[j] θj a
a2j if a θj lk[j],
where lk[j] is the lottery that assigns probability k to a
2
j and probability 1− k to a3j .
17
(iii) In all other cases, gN(m) = a1j where j ∈ N is the player with the lowest index among
those who announce the highest integer.12
The outcome function gS is as follows:
(i’) If for every player i ∈ S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a.
(ii’) If for |S| − 1 players i 6= j in S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), but mj =
(θj, a
1
j , a
2
j , a
3
j , zj) 6= (θ, a1j , a, a, 0), then
gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
=
{
a if lk[j] θj a.
a3j if a θj lk[j].
(iii’) In all other cases, gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a1j where j ∈ S is the player with the lowest index
among those players in S who announce the highest integer in the profile (mi)i∈S.
Finally, for all S ′ ∈ N \ {N,S}, the outcome function gS′ can be arbitrary.
Thus, each player sends a message with five components (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , zi). The outcome
functions gN and gS are defined like in the canonical mechanism of Maskin (1999) with
three rules. The first rules are used when there is agreement in all the messages received
by the planner, except possibly in the second components a1i . In this case, the planner
implements the commonly agreed alternative. The second rules allow the planner to use
weak S-monotonicity of the SCR to eliminate the possibility that players agree on a message
with a “bad” alternative. In such a situation, rule (ii) gives any commoner j the opportunity
to deviate and implement a strictly preferred alternative a2j when the senate is N by using
the reversal of her preferences over alternatives around the “bad” alternative. Although the
probability that a2j will be implemented is arbitrarily small, the fact that it is positive and
deviations by commoner j do not affect the alternative that is implemented when the senate
is S provide sufficient incentives for j to deviate. Similarly, whenever the players agree on
a “bad” alternative, rules (ii) and (ii’) give any oligarch j the opportunity to deviate and
12The advantage of the integer game in our framework is that by announcing a high enough integer, a
player can win the integer game in every senate. Notice that this cannot be achieved by using the modulo
game in which each player announces a single integer. A particular integer might make the player win
the modulo game in one senate but she could at the same time lose the modulo game in some other senate.
Hence, in order to replace the integer game with the modulo game, we need each player to announce as many
integers between 1 and n as the number of senates she can be a member of. Thus, in oligarchic democracy,
oligarchs must announce two integers. The mechanisms used in the proofs for oligarchic democracy can
be altered in this fashion without changing the results. In contrast, the proof of the main result in the
random-sampling model relies heavily on the existence of a unique player who has the lowest index among
those who announce the highest integer in the whole population. Thus, replacing the integer game with the
modulo game seems difficult in that model. However, the use of both these games in implementation has
been criticized; see Jackson (1992).
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implement a strictly preferred lottery by using the reversal of her preferences over lotteries,
which have at most two alternatives in their supports, around the “bad” alternative. This is
done by implementing a2j in case the senate is N , and a
3
j when the senate is S. Finally, the
third rules eliminate the possibility of any equilibria other than those in which all players
agree in their messages. In these situations, at least n − 1 players are such that each of
them can implement her most-preferred alternative when the senate is N by announcing
such an alternative in the second component of her message and a high enough integer.
However, such a deviation will be improving if it does not cause a worse alternative to be
implemented when the senate is S. This is obviously true for the commoners. On the other
hand, since rule (ii’) does not depend on the second and the last components of the deviating
oligarch’s message, every oligarch also ensures that a worse alternative is not implemented
when the senate is S. As a result, we obtain a contradiction with the assumption of economic
environment. These arguments are formalized in the proof presented in the Appendix. 
4.2.2 Comparison
We obtain the following result as a corollary of Theorem 2.9, Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4:
Corollary 4.5. Suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E is an economic environment. If F is Nash
implementable, then F is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy.
Thus, in economic environments, any SCR that is implementable by direct democracy
(i.e., Nash implementable) is also implementable by any S-oligarchic democracy that has at
least three oligarchs. In particular, any three players can be designated as the oligarchs in
order to implement any SCR in economic environments using oligarchic democracy.
The next example shows that there are SCRs that are implementable by oligarchic democ-
racies but not Nash implementable. Hence, weak S-monotonicity is strictly weaker than
Maskin monotonicity.
Example 4.6 (Strong Pareto Correspondence). Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {a, b, c, d} and
Θ = {θ, θ′}. The preferences of the four players over alternatives in the two states are as
follows:
θ θ′
a θ1 b θ1 c θ1 d a θ′1 b ∼θ′1 c θ′1 d
b θ2 c θ2 d θ2 a b ∼θ′2 c ∼θ′2 d ∼θ′2 a
c θ3 d θ3 a θ3 b d θ′3 c θ′3 a θ′3 b
a θ4 c ∼θ4 d θ4 b c θ′4 a ∼θ′4 d θ′4 b
Furthermore, we assume that players’ preferences over lotteries are represented by expected
utility.
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Let SCR F be the strong Pareto correspondence, i.e., for all θ′′ ∈ Θ,
F (θ′′) = {aˆ ∈ A : @a′ ∈ A s.t. ∀i ∈ N, a′ θ′′i aˆ and ∃j ∈ N with a′ θ
′′
j aˆ}
It is easy to see that F (θ) = {a, b, c} and F (θ′) = {a, c, d}. F is not Maskin monotonic since
b ∈ F (θ), b /∈ F (θ′) but there does not exist any player i and alternative aˆ such that b θi aˆ
and aˆ θ′i b. Therefore, F is not Nash implementable.
We argue that F is weak S-monotonic for any S ⊂ N such that 1 ∈ S. Since player 1 has
expected-utility preferences, a θ1 b θ1 c and a θ′1 b ∼θ′1 c imply that there exists a small
enough ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all  ∈ (0, ′], we have
b θ1 l and l θ
′
1 b,
where l is the lottery with l(a) =  and l(c) = 1− . Moreover, for alternative d, which is
such that d ∈ F (θ′) but d /∈ F (θ), we have player 3 with d θ′3 c and c θ3 d. Therefore, if
1 ∈ S, then for any sequence (k)∞k=1 such that k ∈ (0, ′] and limk→∞ k = 0, F satisfies the
conditions for weak S-monotonicity.
It is easy to see that the environment is economic. Hence, Theorem 4.4 implies that F
is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy, where 1 ∈ S and |S| = 3. 
Here, we note that the strong Pareto correspondence is not necessarily weak S-monotonic
in every economic environment. Still, as the above example illustrates, compared to Nash
implementation, we can implement the strong Pareto correspondence by S-oligarchic democ-
racy in a larger set of economic environments.
4.3 Noneconomic Environments
Interestingly, when the environment is not economic, there can exist SCRs that are Nash im-
plementable but not implementable by any S-oligarchic democracy. An example is provided
next.
Example 4.7. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {a, b} and Θ = {θ, θ′, θ′′, θˆ, θˆ′, θˆ′′}. The preferences
of the four players over alternatives in the six states are as follows:
θ θ′ θ′′ θˆ θˆ′ θˆ′′
a θ1 b a θ′1 b b ∼θ′′1 a b ∼θˆ1 a a θˆ′1 b a θˆ′′1 b
a ∼θ2 b b θ′2 a b θ′′2 a b θˆ2 a b θˆ′2 a a ∼θˆ′′2 b
a ∼θ3 b b θ′3 a b θ′′3 a b θˆ3 a a ∼θˆ′3 b b θˆ′′3 a
a θ4 b b ∼θ′4 a a θ′′4 b b ∼θˆ4 a a θˆ′4 b a θˆ′′4 b
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This environment is not economic. For instance, in state θ, a θi b for all i ∈ N .
Let SCR F be such that F (θ) = F (θˆ′) = F (θˆ′′) = {a} and F (θ′) = F (θ′′) = F (θˆ) = {b}.
F is Maskin monotonic and hence, weak S-monotonic for any S ⊂ N . Furthermore, F
satisfies no-veto power. Hence, F is Nash implementable.
We argue that F is not implementable by S-oligarchic democracy for any S ⊂ N . Suppose
there exists a sequence of (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanisms
(
ΓO(S,k)
)∞
k=1
such that
k ∈ (0, 1),∀k, with limk→∞ k → 0, and for all k,
{
l[S, k,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ˜)
}
= F (θ˜)
for all θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Pick any k and consider m
k ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ′). It must be that gS(mkS) = gN(mk) = b.
Moreover, for any m1 ∈ M1, we must have gS((m1,mk−1)S) = gN(m1,mk−1) = b because
otherwise, player 1 has an incentive to deviate to m1 in state θ
′. This further implies that
there must exist m4 ∈M4 such that either gS((m4,mk−4)S) = a or gN(m4,mk−4) = a because
otherwise, mk ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ).
If 4 /∈ S. Then gS((m4,mk−4)S) = gS(mkS) = b. Hence, it must be that gN(m4,mk−4) = a.
We claim that (m4,m
k
−4) ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ). Clearly, players 2, 3 and 4 do not have any
improving unilateral deviations. On the other hand, if player 1 were to deviate to any m1,
then gS((m1,m4,m
k
−{1,4})
S) = gS((m1,m
k
−1)
S) = b. Hence, player 1 also does not have an
improving unilateral deviation. Hence, (m4,m
k
−4) ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ). But then we have a
contradiction since gS((m4,m
k
−4)
S) = b. Therefore, 4 ∈ S.
The above argument involved θ′ and θ. Similarly, using θ′′ and θ we can argue that 1 ∈ S;
using θˆ′ and θˆ we can argue that 3 ∈ S, and finally, using θˆ′′ and θˆ we can argue that 2 ∈ S.
Hence, we obtain a contradiction to the fact that S ⊂ N . 
4.3.1 Sufficient Conditions
The environment in the previous example does not satisfy DTA-S for all S. The problem for
implementation using oligarchic democracy when S is the set of oligarchs and the environ-
ment does not satisfy DTA-S can be intuitively explained as follows. Suppose the players
have expected-utility preferences. Let a be in the SCR in state θ and consider the equilib-
rium m of an (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanism that implements a. It must be that by
unilaterally changing her message, no oligarch can implement an alternative when the senate
is S that she strictly prefers to a in state θ. If this were not true, and if k is small enough,
the oligarch will prefer to deviate. Now, consider another state θ′ such that in going from
state θ to θ′, alternative a drops out of the SCR but for every oligarch, there is no reversal of
her preferences over alternatives around a (i.e., for all i ∈ S, a θi b =⇒ a θ′i b,∀b). Pick
any message profile m′ = ((mi)i∈S, (m′j)j /∈S), i.e., the messages of the oligarchs in m
′ are the
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same as in m. Since m′S = mS, alternative a is still implemented when the senate is S. But
a is not in the SCR in state θ′ and hence, m′ must not be an equilibrium in state θ′. Since for
any oligarch, there is no reversal of her preferences over alternatives around a, it follows from
the previous argument that no oligarch can implement a strictly preferred alternative when
the senate is S. Thus, the only way an oligarch will deviate from m′ is if she can implement
a strictly preferred alternative when the senate is N . However, now suppose that m′ is such
that the alternative implemented when the senate is N is unanimously most-preferred by all
the players, which is possible since the environment it not economic. Then clearly, no player
will have an incentive to deviate from m′ and hence, we will not be able to implement the
SCR.
As the next result shows, this problem can be avoided if we restrict attention to environ-
ments satisfying DTA-S (proof is in the Appendix).
Theorem 4.8. Suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E satisfies DTA-S. Any Maskin monotonic SCR
F that satisfies no-veto power is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy.
Stronger results can be established under further restrictions on the environments. For
instance, consider the class of environments that satisfy both DTA-S and unique-top condi-
tion. Note that this class of environments is not a subset of economic environments. The next
result shows that we can drop the requirement of no-veto power in this class of environments
(proof is in the Appendix).
Theorem 4.9. Suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E satisfies DTA-S and unique-top condition. Any
Maskin monotonic SCR F is implementable by S-oligarchic democracy.
As an application of the above theorem, consider an environment with single-peaked
preferences. For instance, suppose a large society faces the problem of implementing a
tax rate. A state describes the “ideological” biases of each individual. The “left-wing”
individuals have the peaks of their preferences at higher tax rates whereas “right-wing”
individuals have the peaks of their preferences at lower tax rates. Furthermore, suppose
that there are two individuals, say il and ir, whose “ideological” biases never coincide, i.e.,
the peaks of their preferences are different in every state. Then the above theorem says
that we can implement any Maskin monotonic SCR by oligarchic democracy if we designate
individuals il, ir and any other third individual j as oligarchs.
Remark 4.10. We are unable to strengthen either Theorem 4.8 or 4.9 by replacing Maskin
monotonicity with weak S-monotonicity of the SCR. However, we can reduce this gap be-
tween necessary and sufficient conditions in case of environments satisfying unique-top con-
dition. That is, suppose 3 ≤ |S| < n and E satisfies DTA-S and unique-top condition. Then
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any weak S-monotonic SCR F that satisfies no-veto power is implementable by S-oligarchic
democracy (proof upon request).
5 Implementation by Random Sampling
5.1 Necessary Condition
We first present the necessary condition. Recall the definitions of Nn¯ and let Nn¯(i) be the
set of all senates S ∈ Nn¯ such that i ∈ S. For any function h : Nn¯ → A, define the lottery
induced by h, denoted by l[h], as the lottery that assigns to each a ∈ A the probability
|{S ∈ Nn¯ : h(S) = a}|/|Nn¯|.
Definition 5.1. SCR F is R(n¯)-monotonic if whenever a ∈ F (θ) and a /∈ F (θ) for some a,
θ and θ′, then there exist player i ∈ N and function hi : Nn¯ → A such that
hi(S) = a,∀S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i), a θi l[hi] and l[hi] θ
′
i a.
Thus, R(n¯)-monotonicity requires that whenever an alternative a is in the SCR for some
state θ but drops out of the SCR in state θ′, then in going from θ to θ′, there must exist
some player i for whom there is reversal of her preferences over lotteries around a (i.e., there
is a lottery that she weakly prefers to a in θ but this is not true in θ′), where we consider
only those lotteries that are induced by all possible mappings hi : Nn¯ → A with the property
that hi(S) = a for any S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i).
The following theorem shows that R(n¯)-monotonicity is necessary for implementation by
n¯-random sampling.
Theorem 5.2. If SCR F is implementable by n¯-random sampling, then F is R(n¯)-monotonic.
Proof. Let Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , R(n¯), (gS)S∈N ) be the R(n¯)-sampling mechanism that implements
F . Suppose there exist a, θ and θ′ such that a ∈ F (θ) but a /∈ F (θ′). Then there must exist
m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) with l[R(n¯),m] = a, i.e., gS(mS) = a for all S ∈ Nn¯. Since a /∈ F (θ′), we
have m /∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ′). Hence, there must exist i ∈ N and m′i ∈Mi such that
a θi l[R(n¯), (m′i,m−i)] and l[R(n¯), (m′i,m−i)] θ
′
i a.
Lottery l[R(n¯), (m′i,m−i)] assigns to each alternative a
′ ∈ A, the probability of |{S ∈ Nn¯ :
gS((m′i,m−i)
S) = a′}|/|Nn¯|. But gS((m′i,m−i)S) = gS(mS) = a for all S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i).
Hence, player i and function hi : Nn¯ → A such that hi(S) = gS((m′i,m−i)S) for all S ∈ Nn¯
satisfy the required condition.
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The proof clarifies why R(n¯)-monotonicity requires the particular reversal of preferences
over lotteries. In n¯-random sampling, the messages of any player i are considered only if she
is selected in the sample, i.e., whenever the senate is S ∈ Nn¯(i). Hence, by changing her
message, player i can change the alternative that is implemented when the senate is S only
if S ∈ Nn¯(i). That is why, whenever player i has an improving unilateral deviation in R(n¯)-
sampling mechanism, it must be that she is able to generate a strictly preferred lottery that
is induced by some hi : Nn¯ → A with the property that hi(S) = a for any S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i).
The particular reversal of preferences over lotteries around an alternative required in
R(n¯)-monotonicity is obviously weaker than the reversal of preferences over alternatives
around an alternative required in Maskin monotonicity. Hence, we easily have the following
lemma (proof is omitted):
Lemma 5.3. If F is Maskin monotonic, then F is R(n¯)-monotonic for all positive n¯ < n.
5.2 Sufficient Condition
The next result gives the sufficient condition for implementation by n¯-random sampling.
Theorem 5.4. Let 4 ≤ n¯ < n and E satisfy DTA-N and top-coincidence condition. If SCR
F is Maskin monotonic, then F is implementable by n¯-random sampling.
Sketch of the proof : For each player j ∈ N , let
S(j) =
{
{S ∈ Nn¯(j) : {1, 2} ⊂ S}, if j > 2.
{S ∈ Nn¯(j) : {3, 4} ⊂ S}, if j ∈ {1, 2}.
Define the R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) = ((Mi)i∈N , R(n¯), (gS)S∈N ) in which for all
i ∈ N ,
Mi = Θ× A× A× Z+.
Let a typical message mi be of the form (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi).
For each S ∈ Nn¯, the outcome function gS is as follows:
(i) If for every player i ∈ S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a
(ii) If for |S|−1 players i 6= j in S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), butmj = (θj, a1j , a2j , zj) 6=
(θ, a1j , a, 0), then
gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
=
{
a if a2j θj a or S /∈ S(j)
a2j if a θj a2j and S ∈ S(j).
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(iii) In all other cases, gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a1j where j ∈ S is the player with the lowest index
among those players in S who announce the highest integer in the profile (mi)i∈S.
Finally, for all S ′ ∈ N \ Nn¯, the outcome function gS′ can be arbitrary.
Thus, each player sends a message with four components (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi). For every possible
senate S ∈ Nn¯ that can be selected by random sampling, the outcome function gS is defined
like in the canonical mechanism of Maskin (1999) with three rules. The first rule is used
when there is agreement in all the messages sampled by the planner, except possibly in
the second components a1i . In this case, the planner implements the commonly agreed
alternative. The second rule allows the planner to use Maskin monotonicity of the SCR to
eliminate the possibility that players agree on a message with a “bad” alternative. In such
a situation, rule (ii) gives any player j the opportunity to deviate and implement a strictly
preferred alternative a2j if the senate is S ∈ S(j) by using the reversal of her preferences over
alternatives around the “bad” alternative. However, if the senate is S /∈ S(j), then player j
cannot undo the implementation of the “bad” alternative by being the only one to disagree
with the rest of the players in S. Since the probability that some S ∈ S(j) will be sampled
is positive, the probability that a2j will be implemented is positive. Moreover, deviations by
player j do not affect the alternative implemented when the sampled senate is S ∈ Nn¯ \S(j).
This provides sufficient incentives for j to deviate. Finally, the third rule eliminates the
possibility of any equilibria other than those in which all players agree in their messages.
There are two possibilities:
(a) There are at least three individuals whose messages disagree amongst each other. In
this case, we find an alternative that is unanimously most-preferred by all players, which
contradicts DTA-N . To see how this is done, suppose one of these three players is player i1
who is defined as the player with the lowest index among the players in N who announce
the highest integer (the proof takes care of other cases). Then for any player j, we consider
the senate in which the three disagreeing players are selected along with player j, which
is possible since the sample size is four. Due to the disagreement, rule (iii) is used in this
senate, and hence alternative announced by i1 in the second component of her message, say
a1i1 , is implemented. Since rule (iii) is used in this senate, player j could have also announced
her most-preferred alternative and a higher integer than that of i1 in order to implement
her most-preferred alternative in this senate. Furthermore, since rule (ii) does not depend
on the second and last components of player j’s message, she would not be worse-off by this
deviation in any other senate selection. Therefore, it must be that a1i is most-preferred by
all players j, contradicting DTA-N .
(b) There are only two individuals whose messages disagree (as already pointed out, the
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cases when all players agree are taken care of by rules (i) and (ii)). Then every other player
agrees with at least one of these two and hence, there is a unique disagreeing player, say i. In
this case, we find two alternatives that are most-preferred by n−1 players, which contradicts
top-coincidence condition. To do this, for any player j 6= i, we consider two senates that
contain both players j and i such that one senate S ′1 is in S(i) and the other senate S ′2 is not
in S(i). This is possible because n¯ ≥ 4. Due to the presence of a unique disagreeing player,
rule (ii) is used in both these senates. Suppose the alternative announced by j in her third
component, say a2 – which is the same for all j 6= i since their messages coincide –, is weakly
preferred by i to her third component, say a2i , and a
2 6= a2i (the proof takes care of other
cases). Then a2i is implemented if the senate is S
′
1 and a
2 is implemented if the senate is S ′2.
Now, if either a2 or a2i is not a most-preferred alternative of j, then player j can be better-off
by deviating like in (a) above. Thus, we obtain that both a2 and a2i must be most-preferred
by all player j 6= i, contradicting top-coincidence condition.
The above arguments are formalized in the proof presented in the Appendix. 
Since every economic environment satisfies both DTA-N and top-coincidence condition,
we have the following corollary:
Corollary 5.5. Let 4 ≤ n¯ < n and E be an economic environment. If SCR F is Maskin
monotonic, then F is implementable by n¯-random sampling.
Remark 5.6. We are unable to strengthen either Theorem 5.4 or Corollary 5.5 by replacing
Maskin monotonicity with R(n¯)-monotonicity of the SCR. However, we can close this gap
between necessary and sufficient conditions in case of economic environments that satisfy
unique-top condition. That is, let 4 ≤ n¯ < n and E be an economic environment satisfying
unique-top condition. Then any R(n¯)-monotonic SCR F is implementable by n¯-random
sampling (proof upon request).
5.3 Comparison
The following result easily follows from Theorem 2.9 and Corollary 5.5:
Corollary 5.7. Suppose 4 ≤ n¯ < n and E is an economic environment. If F is Nash
implementable, then F is implementable by n¯-random sampling.
Thus, in economic environments, any SCR that is implementable by direct democracy
(i.e., Nash implementable) is also implementable by randomly sampling only four – or more
– messages of the players.
The next example shows that even in economic environments, four is the minimal sample
size that guarantees the implementation of Maskin monotonic SCRs by random sampling.
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Example 5.8. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {a, b} and Θ = {θ, θ′}. The preferences of the
five players over alternatives in the two states are as follows:
θ θ′
a θ1 b a θ′1 b
a θ2 b a θ′2 b
a θ3 b b θ′3 a
b θ4 a b θ′4 a
b θ5 a b θ′5 a
Let SCR F be such that F (θ) = {a, b} and F (θ′) = {b}. The environment is economic
and F is Maskin monotonic. Hence, F is Nash implementable.
We argue that F is not implementable by R(n¯)-random sampling for any n¯ ≤ 3. Suppose
there exists a R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) such that
{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ˜)
}
=
F (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Consider m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) such that l[R(n¯),m] = a. It must be that gS(mS) = a,∀S ∈
Nn¯. Moreover, for i ∈ {4, 5}, there must not exist any m′i such that for some S ∈ Nn¯
with i ∈ S, we have gS((m′i,m−i)S) = b; otherwise, player i has an incentive to deviate
to m′i in state θ. Consider mˆ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) such that l[R(n¯), mˆ] = b. It must be that
gS(mˆS) = b,∀S ∈ Nn¯. Moreover, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there must not exist any m′i such that for
some S ∈ Nn¯ with i ∈ S, we have gS
(
(m′i, mˆ−i)
S
)
= a; otherwise, player i has an incentive
to deviate to m′i in state θ.
Consider the message profile m˜ = (m1,m2,m3, mˆ4, mˆ5).
• Suppose n¯ = 3. If S ∈ {1, 4, 5}⋃{2, 4, 5}⋃{3, 4, 5}, then gS(m˜S) = b whereas if
S ∈ Nn¯ \ {1, 4, 5}
⋃{2, 4, 5}⋃{3, 4, 5}, then gS(mˆS) = a. Then m˜ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ)
since players 1, 2 and 3 cannot unilaterally change the alternative implemented for any
S ∈ {1, 4, 5}⋃{2, 4, 5}⋃{3, 4, 5} whereas players 4 and 5 cannot unilaterally change
the alternative implemented for any S ∈ Nn¯ \ {1, 4, 5}
⋃{2, 4, 5}⋃{3, 4, 5}. But both
a and b are in the support of the lottery l[R(n¯), m˜], a contradiction.
• Suppose n¯ = 2. Then for S = {3, 4}, we have gS(m˜S) = gS(m3, mˆ4). We have already
argued that for S = {3, 4}, there does not exist any m′4 such that gS(m3,m′4) = b.
Hence, gS(m3, mˆ4) = a. For S = {3, 4}, we have also argued that there does not exist
any m′3 such that g
S(m′3, mˆ4) = a. Hence, g
S(m3, mˆ4) = b, a contradiction.
• Suppose n¯ = 1. We have already argued that for S = {4}, there does not exist
any m′4 such that g
S
(
(m′4,m−4)
S
)
= gS(m′4) = b. But that contradicts the fact that
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gS(mˆ4) = b. 
The next two examples show that the sufficiency result of Theorem 5.4 is not longer
true if we consider environments outside the class of environments satisfying DTA-N and
top-coincidence condition. In the first example, the environment satisfies top-coincidence
condition but not DTA-N . The SCR in the example is Nash implementable as it satisfies
Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power but it is not implementable by n¯-random sampling
when sample size n¯ = 4.
Example 5.9. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {a, b} and Θ = {θ, θ′}. The preferences of the
five players over alternatives in the two states are as follows:
θ θ′
a ∼θ1 b b θ′1 a
a ∼θ2 b b θ′2 a
a ∼θ3 b b θ′3 a
a θ4 b a θ′4 b
a θ5 b b θ′5 a
Let SCR F be such that F (θ) = {a} and F (θ′) = {b}. Since F is Maskin monotonic and
satisfies no-veto power, F is Nash implementable.
The environment satisfies top-coincidence condition but does not satisfy DTA-N since a is
the unanimously most-preferred alternative in state θ. We argue that F is not implementable
by R(n¯)-random sampling for n¯ = 4. Suppose there exists a R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯)
such that
{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ˜)
}
= F (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Consider m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ′) such that l[R(n¯),m] = b. It must be that gS(mS) = b,∀S ∈
Nn¯. Moreover, there must not exist any m′4 such that for some S ∈ Nn¯ with 4 ∈ S, we
have gS
(
(m′4,m−4)
S
)
= a; otherwise, player 4 has an incentive to deviate to m′4 in state θ
′.
Since b /∈ F (θ), it must be that m /∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). Now, only player i ∈ {4, 5} is such that
there exists an alternative that she prefers to b in state θ. However, given m−4, player 4
cannot change the alternative implemented for any senate by changing her message. Hence,
it must be player 5 for whom there exists m′5 such that for some S ∈ Nn¯ with 5 ∈ S, we
have gS
(
(m′5,m−5)
S
)
= a. Without loss of generality, let m′5 be the best response to m−5 in
state θ.
If m′ = (m′5,m−5) ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ), then alternative b is implemented when the senate is
S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, a contradiction. Hence, m′ /∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). Since m′5 is a best response to
m−5 = (m1,m2,m3,m4), and players 1, 2, and 3 are indifferent between a and b, it must be
that player 4 has an improving unilateral deviation. Let mˆ4 be the best response to m
′
−4 =
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(m1,m2,m3,m
′
5). Since m
′ was such that for at least one S ∈ Nn¯, we have gS(m′S) = a, the
new message profile mˆ = (m1,m2,m3, mˆ4,m
′
5) must be such that for at least two S ∈ Nn¯, we
have gS(mˆS) = a; otherwise, player 4 will not strictly improve with her deviation to mˆ4. If
mˆ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ), then the alternative b is implemented when the senate is S = {1, 2, 3, 4}
because, as already argued, gS(m1,m2,m3, mˆ4) = b, which is a contradiction. Hence, mˆ /∈
NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). Since mˆ4 is a best response to mˆ−4 = (m1,m2,m3,m′5), and players 1, 2,
and 3 are indifferent between a and b, it must be that player 5 has an improving unilateral
deviation. Let m˜5 be the best response to mˆ−5 = (m1,m2,m3, mˆ4). Since mˆ was such that for
at least two S ∈ Nn¯, we have gS(mˆS) = a, the new message profile m˜ = (m1,m2,m3, mˆ4, m˜5)
must be such that for at least three S ∈ Nn¯, we have gS(m˜S) = a; otherwise, player 5 will
not strictly improve with her deviation to m˜5. If m˜ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ), then the alternative b
is implemented when the senate is S = {1, 2, 3, 4} because gS(m1,m2,m3, mˆ4) = b, which
is a contradiction. Hence, m˜ /∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). By repeating the above argument, player
4 will switch to her best response mˆ′4 and the message profile mˆ
′ = (m1,m2,m3, mˆ′4, m˜5)
will be such that for at least four S ∈ Nn¯, we have gS(mˆ′S) = a. This means that for all
S ∈ Nn¯ such that 5 ∈ S, we have gS(mˆ′S) = a. Then mˆ′ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) because player 4
is already playing a best response to m˜−4 = (m1,m2,m3, m˜5) and player 5 cannot change
the alternative implemented when S = {1, 2, 3, 4}. However, gS(m1,m2,m3, mˆ′4) = b for
S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, a contradiction. 
In the next example, the environment satisfies DTA-N but not top-coincidence condition.
The SCR is Nash implementable but it is not implementable by n¯-random sampling when
sample size n¯ = 4.
Example 5.10. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {a, b, c} and Θ = {θ, θ′}. The preferences of
the five players over alternatives in the two states are as follows:
θ θ′
c θ1 a ∼θ1 b c θ′1 a θ′1 b
a ∼θ2 b θ2 c a ∼θ′2 b θ′2 c
a ∼θ3 b θ3 c a ∼θ′3 b θ′3 c
a ∼θ4 b θ4 c a ∼θ′4 b θ′4 c
a ∼θ5 b θ5 c a ∼θ′5 b θ′5 c
Let SCR F be such that F (θ) = {a, b} and F (θ′) = {a}. F is Maskin monotonic.
However, F does not satisfy no-veto power since in θ′, b is most-preferred alternative for four
players but b /∈ F (θ′). Still, F is Nash implementable. To show this, first we argue that F
is implementable by S oligarchy, where S = {1}. Define an S-oligarchic mechanism such
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that M1 = {a, b} and gS(m1) = m1 for all m1 ∈ M1. Since only the message of player 1 is
transmitted to the planner, in state θ, player 1 is indifferent between announcing messages a
and b whereas in state θ′, player 1 will announce a. Thus, {gS(mS) : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S), θ)} =
{a, b} and {gS(mS) : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S), θ′)} = {a}. Hence, F is implementable by S = {1}
oligarchy. It follows from Proposition 3.6 that F is Nash implementable.
The environment satisfies DTA-N but not top-coincidence condition since both a and b
are most-preferred alternatives for all players 2 through 5 in both states θ and θ′. We argue
that F is not implementable by R(n¯)-random sampling for n¯ = 4. Suppose there exists a
R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) such that
{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ˜)
}
= F (θ˜) for all
θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Consider m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ) such that l[R(n¯),m] = b. It must be that gS(mS) = b, ∀S ∈
Nn¯. Observe that for any m′′1 and S ∈ Nn¯ which includes player 1, gS
(
(m′′1,m−1)
S
) 6= c;
otherwise, player 1 would unilaterally deviate to m′′1 from m in state θ. Moreover, because
b /∈ F (θ′), it must be that b /∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ′). Hence, there must exist player i, m′i ∈ Mi
and S ∈ Nn¯ such that gS
(
(m′i,m−i)
S
) θ′i b. Because b is a most-preferred alternative for
players 2 through 5 in state θ′, it must be that i = 1. We already know gS
(
(m′1,m−1)
S
) 6= c.
Consequently, gS
(
(m′1,m−1)
S
)
= a.
Now consider
(
m′1,m−1
)
. As argued, alternative a is implemented for some S ∈ Nn¯
such that 1 ∈ S. However, alternative b is implemented when the senate is S = {2, 3, 4, 5}
since gS
(
(m′1,m−1)
S
)
= gS(mS) = b as (m′1,m−1)
S = mS. Hence, to reach the desired
contradiction, it suffices to show
(
m′1,m−1
) ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ).
If 1 /∈ S ∈ Nn¯, then gS
(
(m′1,m−1)
S
)
= b because (m′1,m−1)
S = mS. In addition, if
1 ∈ S ∈ Nn¯, then gS
(
(m′1,m−1)
S
)
is either a or b. Since both alternatives a and b are
most-preferred by players 2 through 5 in state θ, none of these players has an incentive to
deviate from (m′1,m−1). We already know that for any m
′′
1 and S ∈ Nn¯ which includes
player 1, gS
(
(m′′1,m−1)
S
) 6= c. Therefore, for any unilateral deviation by player 1 from
(m′1,m−1), either a or b is implemented. But player 1 is indifferent between a and b in
state θ. Hence, player 1 also has no incentive to deviate from (m′1,m−1) in state θ. Thus,(
m′1,m−1
) ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). 
6 Conclusion
Within the large class of economic environments, our results suggest that costs and time
involved in collecting opinions of individuals in a community in order implement Maskin
monotonic SCRs can be substantially reduced by using alternative political processes. For
simplicity, let’s assume that there is a fixed cost c of collecting each individual’s message.
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Then the cost incurred in direct democracy is nc. On the other hand, our result on oligarchic
democracy implies that the expected cost of collecting individuals’ messages can be reduced
to arbitrarily close to 3c in economic environments. However, there is a positive, though very
small chance, that the realized cost will be nc when N is selected as the senate in oligarchic
democracy. If we are concerned with the ex-post cost of collecting individuals’ messages,
then random sampling with sample size of four can be used in economic environments,
guaranteeing an ex-post cost of only 4c.
Our positive results, however, need not carry over to incomplete information environ-
ments. For instance, if players have private values, then the state of the world cannot be
known even if n − 1 individuals truthfully report their types. Thus, SCRs that are not
“measurable” with respect to the information of the selected subset of individuals cannot
be implemented in such an environment. Nevertheless, we expect that similar positive re-
sults can be obtained for incomplete information environments in which some subsets of the
individuals are “better” informed than others. We leave these issues for future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.4: Consider the sequence of (S, k)-oligarchic-democratic mechanisms(
ΓO(S,k)
)∞
k=1
defined in the sketch of the proof.
Step 1. For all k and θ ∈ Θ, F (θ) ⊆
{
l[S, k,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ)
}
.
Fix k and θ. Pick any a ∈ F (θ). Consider m ∈ M such that mi = (θ, a, a, a, 0) for all
i ∈ N . Then l[S, k,m] = a. We argue that m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ). Suppose player i deviates
from mi to m
′
i = (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , zi).
First, suppose i ∈ S. Then rule (ii) will be used when N is the senate. In that case,
a is implemented if lk[i] θi a and a2i is implemented if a θi lk[i]. On the other hand, rule
(ii’) will be used when S is the senate. In that case, a is implemented if lk[i] θi a and a3i
is implemented if a θi lk[i]. Therefore, if lk[i] θi a, then l[S, k, (m′i,m−i)] = a whereas if
a θi lk[i], then l[S, k, (m′i,m−i)] = lk[i]. Hence, in either case, player i does not improve by
her deviation.
Second, suppose i ∈ N \ S. Then rule (ii) will be used when N is the senate. In that
case, a is implemented if a2i θi a and a2i is implemented if a θi a2i . On the other hand, a
will be implemented when S is the senate. Therefore, if a2i θi a, then l[S, k, (m′i,m−i)] = a
whereas if a θi a2i , then l[S, k, (m′i,m−i)] is the lottery that assigns probability k to a2i
and probability 1− k to a. Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player i does not
improve by her deviation.
Therefore, m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ).
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Step 2. For all k and θ ∈ Θ,
{
l[S, k,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ)
}
⊆ F (θ).
Fix k and θ. Pick any mˆ ∈ NE(ΓO(S,k), θ). For any i, let mˆi = (θˆi, aˆ1i , aˆ2i , zˆi). We show
that l[S, k, mˆ] ∈ F (θ).
First, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (iii). This means for any i ∈ N , gN(mˆ)
is a most-preferred alternative in state θ. If not, then i can deviate to mi that differs from mˆi
only in the second and last components, with a1i being one of her most-preferred alternatives
in state θ and zi > maxj 6=i zˆj. If N is the selected senate, then gN(mi, mˆ−i) follows rule (iii)
and hence, gN(mi, mˆ−i) = a1i . On the other hand, if S is the selected senate, then one of the
following in true:
• i ∈ N \ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS).
• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (iii’). Then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = a1i .
• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (ii’). There are two possibilities: gS(mˆS) followed
either rule (i’) or (ii’). However, in either case gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS) since the
alternative implemented in rule (ii’) does not depend on the second and last components
of player i’s message.
Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player i will be better-off after the deviation to
mi, a contradiction. But if g
N(mˆ) is the most-preferred alternative in state θ for all players,
then that contradicts the fact that E is an economic environment.
Second, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (ii). Using a similar argument as in
the previous case, gN(mˆ) must be a most-preferred alternative in state θ for at least n − 1
players, which again contradicts with E being economic.
Therefore, gN(mˆ) follows rule (i). Hence, mˆi = (θˆ, aˆ
1
i , aˆ, aˆ, 0) for all i ∈ N , where
aˆ ∈ F (θˆ). If aˆ ∈ F (θ), then we are done. On the other hand, suppose aˆ /∈ F (θ). Then, due
to weak S-monotonicity of F , at least one of the following is true:
• There exist player ik ∈ N \S and alternative a′k such that aˆ θˆik a′k and a′k θik aˆ. Then,
thanks to rule (ii), player ik has an incentive to deviate to (θˆ, aˆ
1
i , a
′
k, aˆ, 0).
• There exist player ik ∈ S, lottery lk, and alternatives aˆk and a˜k such that
lk(aˆk) = k, lk(a˜k) = 1− k, aˆ θˆik lk and lk θik aˆ.
Thanks to rules (ii) and (ii’), player ik has an incentive to deviate to (θˆ, aˆ
1
i , aˆk, a˜k, 0).
Proof of Theorem 4.8: For any  ∈ (0, 1), define ΓO(S,) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, ), (gS′)S′∈N )
such that for all i ∈ N ,
Mi = Θ× A× A× Z+.
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Let a typical message mi be of the form (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi). For all S
′ ∈ {N,S}, the outcome
function gS
′
is as follows:
(i) If for every player i ∈ S ′, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gS′
(
(mi)i∈S′
)
= a.
(ii) If for |S ′| − 1 players i 6= j in S ′, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), but mj =
(θj, a
1
j , a
2
j , zj) 6= (θ, a1j , a, 0), then
gS
′(
(mi)i∈S′
)
=
{
a if a2j θj a.
a2j if a θj a2j .
(iii) In all other cases, gS
′(
(mi)i∈S′
)
= a1j where j ∈ S ′ is the player with the lowest index
among those players in S ′ who announce the highest integer in the profile (mi)i∈S′ .
Finally, for all S ′ ∈ N \ {N,S}, the outcome function gS′ can be arbitrary.
Step 1. For all  ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ Θ, F (θ) ⊆
{
l[S, ,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ)
}
.
Fix  ∈ (0, 1) and θ. Pick any a ∈ F (θ). Consider m ∈ M such that mi = (θ, a, a, 0) for
all i ∈ N . Then l[S, ,m] = a. We argue that m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ). Suppose player i deviates
from mi to m
′
i = (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi).
First, suppose i ∈ S. Then rule (ii) will be used irrespective of whether N or S is the
senate. In either case, a2i is implemented if a θi a2i whereas a is implemented if a2i θi a.
Thus, player i does not improve by her deviation.
Second, suppose i ∈ N \ S. Then rule (ii) will be used when N is the senate. In that
case, a2i is implemented if a θi a2i whereas a is implemented if a2i θi a. On the other hand,
a is implemented when S is the senate. Since the preferences over lotteries are monotone,
player i does not improve by her deviation.
Therefore, m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ).
Step 2. For all  ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ Θ,
{
l[S, ,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ)
}
⊆ F (θ).
Fix  ∈ (0, 1) and θ. Pick any mˆ ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ). For any i, let mˆi = (θˆi, aˆ1i , aˆ2i , zˆi). We
show that l[S, , mˆ] ∈ F (θ).
First, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (iii). This means for any i ∈ N , gN(mˆ)
is a most-preferred alternative in state θ. If not, then i can deviate to mi that differs from mˆi
only in the second and last components, with a1i being one of her most-preferred alternatives
in state θ and zi > maxj 6=i zˆj. If N is the selected senate, then gN(mi, mˆ−i) follows rule (iii)
and hence, gN(mi, mˆ−i) = a1i . On the other hand, if S is the selected senate, then one of the
following in true:
• i ∈ N \ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS).
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• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (iii). Then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = a1i .
• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (ii). Then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS).
Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player i will be better-off after the deviation
to mi, a contradiction. But g
N(mˆ) being the most-preferred alternative in state θ for all
players contradicts DTA-S.
Second, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (ii). It must be that for n− 1 players
i 6= j in N , mˆi = (θˆ, aˆ1i , aˆ, 0) and aˆ ∈ F (θˆ), but mˆj = (θˆj, aˆ1j , aˆ2j , zˆj) 6= (θˆ, aˆ1j , aˆ, 0). Using a
similar argument as in the previous case, gN(mˆ) must be a most-preferred alternative in state
θ for all i 6= j. Since F satisfies no-veto power, we have gN(mˆ) ∈ F (θ). If j ∈ N \S, then that
contradicts DTA-S. Hence, j ∈ S. It follows from rule (ii) that gS(mˆS) = gN(mˆ) ∈ F (θ).
Finally, suppose gN(mˆ) follows rule (i). Hence, each player i sends the message mˆi =
(θˆ, aˆ1i , aˆ, 0), where aˆ ∈ F (θˆ). If aˆ ∈ F (θ), then we are done. On the other hand, suppose
aˆ /∈ F (θ). Then, since F is Maskin monotonic, there exist player i ∈ N and alternative a′
such that aˆ θˆi a′ and a′ θi aˆ. Then, thanks to rule (ii), player i has an incentive to deviate
to (θˆ, aˆ1i , a
′, 0).
Since the above argument was made for all  ∈ (0, 1), it follows that F is implementable
by S-oligarchic democracy.
Proof of Theorem 4.9: For any  ∈ (0, 1), define ΓO(S,) = ((Mi)i∈N , O(S, ), (gS′)S′∈N )
such that for all i ∈ N ,
Mi = Θ× A× A× Z+.
Let a typical message mi be of the form (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi). The outcome function g
N is as follows:
(i) If for every player i ∈ N , mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gN(m) = a.
(ii) If for n−1 players i 6= j in N , mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), but mj = (θj, a1j , a2j , zj) 6=
(θ, a1j , a, 0), then
j ∈ N \ S =⇒ gN(m) =
{
a if a2j θj a.
a2j if a θj a2j .
j ∈ S =⇒ gN(m) = a.
(iii) In all other cases, gN(m) = a1j where j ∈ N is the player with the lowest index among
those who announce the highest integer.
The outcome function gS is as follows:
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(i’) If for every player i ∈ S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), then gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a.
(ii’) If for |S|−1 players i 6= j in S, mi = (θ, a1i , a, 0) and a ∈ F (θ), butmj = (θj, a1j , a2j , zj) 6=
(θ, a1j , a, 0), then
gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
=
{
a if a2j θj a.
a2j if a θj a2j .
(iii’) In all other cases, gS
(
(mi)i∈S
)
= a1j where j ∈ S is the player with the lowest index
among those players in S who announce the highest integer in the profile (mi)i∈S.
Finally, for all S ′ ∈ N \ {N,S}, the outcome function gS′ can be arbitrary.
Step 1. For all  ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ Θ, F (θ) ⊆
{
l[S, ,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ)
}
.
Fix  ∈ (0, 1) and θ. Pick any a ∈ F (θ). Consider m ∈ M such that mi = (θ, a, a, 0) for
all i ∈ N . Then l[S, ,m] = a. We argue that m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ). Suppose player i deviates
from mi to m
′
i = (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi).
First, suppose i ∈ S. Then rule (ii) will be used when N is the senate and hence, a will
be implemented. On the other hand, rule (ii’) will be used when S is the senate. In that
case, a2i is implemented if a θi a2i whereas a is implemented if a2i θi a. Since the preferences
over lotteries are monotone, player i does not improve by her deviation.
Second, suppose i ∈ N \ S. Then rule (ii) will be used when N is the senate. In that
case, a2i is implemented if a θi a2i whereas a is implemented if a2i θi a. On the other hand,
a is implemented when S is the senate. Since the preferences over lotteries are monotone,
player i does not improve by her deviation.
Therefore, m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ).
Step 2. For all  ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ Θ,
{
l[S, ,m] : m ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ)
}
⊆ F (θ).
Fix  ∈ (0, 1) and θ. Pick any mˆ ∈ NE(ΓO(S,), θ). For any i, let mˆi = (θˆi, aˆ1i , aˆ2i , zˆi). We
show that l[S, , mˆ] ∈ F (θ).
First, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (iii). This means for any i ∈ N , gN(mˆ)
is a most-preferred alternative in state θ. If not, then i can deviate to mi that differs from mˆi
only in the second and last components, with a1i being one of her most-preferred alternatives
in state θ and zi > maxj 6=i zˆj. If N is the selected senate, then gN(mi, mˆ−i) follows rule (iii)
and hence, gN(mi, mˆ−i) = a1i . On the other hand, if S is the selected senate, then one of the
following in true:
• i ∈ N \ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS).
• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (iii’). Then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = a1i .
• i ∈ S and gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows rule (ii’). Then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = gS(mˆS).
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Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player i will be better-off after the deviation
to mi, a contradiction. But g
N(mˆ) being the most-preferred alternative in state θ for all
players contradicts DTA-S.
Second, suppose mˆ is such that gN(mˆ) follows rule (ii). It must be that for n− 1 players
i 6= j in N , mˆi = (θˆ, aˆ1i , aˆ, 0) and aˆ ∈ F (θˆ), but mˆj = (θˆj, aˆ1j , aˆ2j , zˆj) 6= (θˆ, aˆ1j , aˆ, 0). Using
a similar argument as in the previous case, gN(mˆ) must be a most-preferred alternative in
state θ for all i 6= j. If j ∈ N \ S, then that contradicts DTA-S. Hence, j ∈ S. It follows
from rule (ii) that gN(mˆ) = aˆ. If S is the senate, then rule (ii’) will be used. We argue
that gS(mˆS) = aˆ. Suppose not; then due to rule (ii’), gS(mˆS) = aˆ2j . This means for any
i ∈ S \ {j}, aˆ2j is a most-preferred alternative in state θ. If not, then such an i can deviate
to mi that differs from mˆi only in the second and last components, with a
1
i being one of
her most-preferred alternatives in state θ and zi > zˆj. If N is the selected senate, then
gN(mi, mˆ−i) follows rule (iii), whereas if S is the selected senate, then gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) follows
rule (iii’). Hence, gN(mi, mˆ−i) = gS((mi, mˆ−i)S) = a1i . Since preferences over lotteries are
monotone, player i will be better-off after the deviation to mi, a contradiction. Thus, both aˆ
2
j
and aˆ are in P1(i, θ) for all i ∈ S \ {j}. By assumption, the environment satisfies unique-top
condition. Hence, it must be that aˆ2j = aˆ. Now, if aˆ ∈ F (θ), then we are done. On the other
hand, aˆ ∈ F (θˆ), aˆ /∈ F (θ), and Maskin monotonicity of F imply that there exists a i′ ∈ N
and a′ ∈ A such that aˆ θˆi′ a′ but a′ θi′ aˆ. But aˆ ∈ P1(i, θ) for all i 6= j. Hence, i′ = j.
But then mˆ cannot be a Nash equilibrium since due to rules (ii) and (ii’), player j has an
improving deviation mj = (θˆj, aˆ
1
j , a
′, zˆj), a contradiction.
Finally, suppose gN(mˆ) follows rule (i). Hence, each player i send the message mˆi =
(θˆ, aˆ1i , aˆ, 0), where aˆ ∈ F (θˆ). If aˆ ∈ F (θ), then we are done. On the other hand, suppose
aˆ /∈ F (θ). Then, since F is Maskin monotonic, there exist player i ∈ N and alternative a′
such that aˆ θˆi a′ and a′ θi aˆ. Then, thanks to rules (ii) and (ii’), player i has an incentive
to deviate to (θˆ, aˆ1i , a
′, 0).
Since the above argument was made for all  ∈ (0, 1), it follows that F is implementable
by S-oligarchic democracy.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: Consider the R(n¯)-sampling mechanism ΓR(n¯) defined in the sketch
of the proof.
Step 1. For any θ ∈ Θ, F (θ) ⊆
{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ)
}
.
Pick any a ∈ F (θ) and consider m ∈ M such that mi = (θ, a, a, 0) for all i ∈ N . Then
l[R(n¯),m] = a. We argue that m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ). Suppose player i deviates from mi to
m′i = (θi, a
1
i , a
2
i , zi). Pick any S ∈ Nn¯. First, suppose S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i). Then rule (i) will be
used when S is the senate and hence, a will be implemented. Second, suppose S ∈ Nn¯(i).
Since |S| = n¯ ≥ 4, rule (ii) will be used when S is the senate. In that case, a is implemented
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if a2i θi a or S /∈ S(i) and a2i is implemented if a θi a2i and S ∈ S(i). Since preferences over
lotteries are monotone, player i does not improve by her deviation. So, m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ).
Step 2. For any θ ∈ Θ,
{
l[R(n¯),m] : m ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ)
}
⊆ F (θ).
We show that if mˆ ∈ NE(ΓR(n¯), θ), then l[R(n¯), mˆ] ∈ F (θ). For any i, let mˆi =
(θˆi, aˆ
1
i , aˆ
2
i , zˆi). Let i1 be the player with the lowest index amongst the players who announce
the highest integer in mˆ.
First, suppose mˆ is such that there exist at least three players, i2, i3 and i4 such that
(θˆi2 , aˆ
2
i2
, zˆi2) 6= (θˆi3 , aˆ2i3 , zˆi3) 6= (θˆi4 , aˆ2i4 , zˆi4) – notice that the second components of these
players’ messages are not being considered. Clearly, there is at most one player in {i2, i3, i4},
denoted by ik, such that (θˆi1 , aˆ
2
i1
, zˆi1) = (θˆik , aˆ
2
ik
, zˆik). Consider any j ∈ N and pick any
S(j) ∈ Nn¯(j) such that (a) if ik = i1, then {i2, i3, i4} ⊂ S(j) and (b) if ik 6= i1, then
{i1, i2, i3, i4} \ {ik} ⊂ S(j) (this is possible since n¯ ≥ 4). Now if S(j) is selected as the
senate, then since there are three players in S(j) with different messages, rule (iii) will be
used. Moreover, since player i1 ∈ S(j), the alternative announced by player i1 in the second
component of her message, aˆ1i1 , will be implemented when S(j) is selected. We claim that
for any j ∈ N , aˆ1i1 is a most-preferred alternative in state θ. Suppose not and let j ∈ N be
such that aˆ1i1 /∈ P1(j, θ). Let player j deviate to mj that differs from mˆj only in the second
and last components, with a1j being one of her most-preferred alternatives in state θ and
zj > zˆi1 . If the selected senate is some S
′ ∈ Nn¯(j), then one of the following will hold:
• gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) follows rule (iii). Then gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) = a1j . Moreover, this will be
the case when S ′ = S(j).
• gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) follows rule (ii). There are two possibilities: gS′(mˆS′) followed either
rule (i) or (ii). However, in either case gS
′
((mj, mˆ−j)S
′
) = gS
′
(mˆS
′
) since the alternative
implemented in rule (ii) does not depend on the second and last components of player
j’s message.
On the other hand, if the selected senate is S ′ ∈ Nn¯\Nn¯(j), then gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) = gS′(mˆS′).
Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player j will be better-off after the deviation
to mj, a contradiction. But if aˆ
1
i1
is the most-preferred alternative in state θ for all players,
then that contradicts E satisfying DTA-N .
Second, suppose mˆ is such that there exist at least two players, i2 and i3 such that
(θˆi2 , aˆ
2
i2
, zˆi2) 6= (θˆi3 , aˆ2i3 , zˆi3) – again, notice that the second components of these players’
messages are not being considered. If there exists a player j such that (θˆi2 , aˆ
2
i2
, zˆi2) 6=
(θˆi3 , aˆ
2
i3
, zˆi3) 6= (θˆj, aˆ2j , zˆj), then we are back in the first case. Hence, for every player j
there exists a player in {i2, i3}, denoted by i(j), such that (θˆj, aˆ2j , zˆj) = (θˆi(j), aˆ2i(j), zˆi(j)). Let
J2 = {j ∈ N : i(j) = i2} and J3 = {j ∈ N : i(j) = i3}. As before, i1 is the player with the
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lowest index amongst the players who announce the highest integer in mˆ. Without loss of
generality, suppose i1 ∈ J2.
• Suppose there exists j2 6= i1 and j3 6= i3 such that j2 ∈ J2 and j3 ∈ J3. Consider
any j ∈ N and define S(j) as follows. If j ∈ {i1, j2, i3, j3}, then let S(j) be any set
in Nn¯(j) such that {i1, j2, i3, j3} ⊆ S(j). If j ∈ J2 \ {i1, j2}, then let S(j) be any set
in Nn¯(j) such that {i1, j, i3, j3} ⊆ S(j). Finally, if j ∈ J3 \ {i3, j3}, then let S(j) be
any set in Nn¯(j) such that {i1, j2, i3, j} ⊆ S(j). In defining S(j), we have made sure
that there are at least two players each from J2 and J3, which is possible since n¯ ≥ 4.
Therefore, if S(j) is selected as the senate, then rule (iii) will be used and hence, the
alternative announced by player i1 in the second component of her message, aˆ
1
i1
, will
be implemented. As before, we can show that for any j ∈ N , aˆ1i1 is a most-preferred
alternative in state θ, which contradicts E satisfying DTA-N .
• Suppose there exists j2 6= i1 such that j2 ∈ J2 but J3 = {i3}. Consider any j ∈ N and
let S(j) be any set in Nn¯(j) such that {i1, j2, i3} ⊂ S(j). Again, this is possible since
n¯ ≥ 4. If S(j) is selected as the senate, then player i3 is the only player in S(j) who
“disagrees”. If zˆi1 6= 0 or aˆ2i1 /∈ F (θˆi1), then rule (iii) will be used in S(j). In this case,
aˆ1i1 will be implemented in S(j). As before, we can show that for any j ∈ N , aˆ1i1 is a
most-preferred alternative in state θ, which contradicts E satisfying DTA-N .
On the other hand, if zˆi1 = 0 and aˆ
2
i1
∈ F (θˆi1), then rule (ii) will be used in S(j).
In fact, in this case, rule (ii) will be used for any S ∈ Nn¯(i3) (since i3 is the only
player in S who “disagrees”) whereas rule (i) will be used for any S ∈ Nn¯ \ Nn¯(i3)
(since all players in S “agree”). Therefore, alternative aˆ2i1 will be implemented for all
S ∈ Nn¯ \ S(i3).
– Suppose aˆ2i3 
θˆi1
i3
aˆ2i1 . Then aˆ
2
i1
is also implemented for all S ∈ S(i3). If aˆ2i1 ∈ F (θ),
then we are done. If aˆ2i1 /∈ F (θ), then by Maskin monotonicity, there exists
a player i and a′ such that aˆ2i1 
θˆi1
i a
′ but a′ θi aˆ2i1 . Let player i deviate to
m′i = (θˆi, a
′, a′, z′), where z′ > 0 = zˆi1 ≥ zˆi3 . If the selected senate is some
S ′ ∈ Nn¯(i), then one of the following will hold:
∗ gS′((m′i, mˆ−i)S′) follows rule (iii). Then gS′((m′i, mˆ−i)S′) = a′.
∗ gS′((m′i, mˆ−i)S′) follows rule (ii). Then gS′((m′i, mˆ−i)S′) = a′ if S ′ ∈ S(i) and
gS
′
((m′i, mˆ−i)
S′) = gS
′
(mˆS
′
) = aˆ2i1 if S
′ /∈ S(i).
Since there is a positive probability of selecting a senate in S(i), player i has an
incentive to deviate, which is a contradiction.
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– Suppose aˆ2i1 
θˆi1
i3
aˆ2i3 . Then aˆ
2
i3
is implemented for all S ∈ S(i3). If aˆ2i1 = aˆ2i3 ∈
F (θ), then we are done. If aˆ2i1 = aˆ
2
i3
/∈ F (θ), then we are back in the previous
case. So suppose aˆ2i1 6= aˆ2i3 . We argue that {aˆ2i1 , aˆ2i3} ∈ P1(j, θ) for all j 6= i3.
If not, then let player j deviate to mj such that mj differs from mˆj only in the
second and last components, with a1j being her most-preferred alternative in state
θ and zj > 0 = zˆi1 ≥ zˆi3 . If the selected senate is some S ′ ∈ Nn¯(j), then one of
the following will hold:
∗ gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) follows rule (iii). Then gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) = a1j . This will
be the case for all S ′ ∈ Nn¯(j) such that i3 ∈ S ′. Furthermore, there exist
S ′1 ∈ S(i3) and S ′2 ∈ Nn¯ \S(i3) such that {i3, j} ∈ S ′1 and {i3, j} ∈ S ′2. This is
because n > n¯ ≥ 4. Before the deviation, gS′1(mˆS′1) = aˆ2i3 while gS
′
2(mˆS
′
2) = aˆ2i1
with at least one alternative out of those two being strictly worse for j than
a1j . On the other hand, after the deviation, player j will be able to implement
her most-preferred alternative both when the senate is S ′1 and S
′
2.
∗ gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) follows rule (ii). This will be the case for all S ′ ∈ Nn¯(j) such
that i3 /∈ S ′. Hence, gS′(mˆS′) followed rule (i). However, gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) =
gS
′
(mˆS
′
) because the alternative implemented under rule (ii) does not depend
on the second and last components of j’s message.
On the other hand, if the selected senate is S ′ ∈ Nn¯\Nn¯(j), then gS′((mj, mˆ−j)S′) =
gS
′
(mˆS
′
). Since preferences over lotteries are monotone, player j will be better-off
after the deviation to mj, a contradiction. But {aˆ2i1 , aˆ2i3} ∈ P1(j, θ) for all j 6= i3
such that aˆ2i1 6= aˆ2i3 contradicts E satisfying top-coincidence condition.
• Suppose there exists j3 6= i3 such that j3 ∈ J3 but J2 = {i1}. This case can be argued
like the previous case.
Therefore, mˆ is such that (θˆi, aˆ
2
i , zˆi) = (θˆ, aˆ, zˆ) for all i ∈ N . Then i1 = 1.
• Suppose either zˆ > 0 or aˆ /∈ F (θˆ). Consider any j ∈ N and let S(j) be any set in
Nn¯(j) such that 1 ∈ S(j). If S(j) is selected as the senate, then rule (iii) will be
used and hence, the alternative announced by player 1 in the second component of her
message, aˆ11, will be implemented. As before, we can show that for any j ∈ N , aˆ11 is a
most-preferred alternative in state θ, which contradicts E satisfying DTA-N .
• Suppose zˆ = 0 and aˆ ∈ F (θˆ). Then because of rule (i), for any S ∈ Nn¯, the alternative
aˆ is implemented when S is the selected senate. If aˆ ∈ F (θˆ), then we are done. If
aˆ /∈ F (θˆ), then there exists a player i and a′ such that aˆ θˆi a′ but a′ θi aˆ. Thanks to
rule (ii), player i has an incentive to deviate to (θˆ, aˆ1i , a
′, 0).
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